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Cox: Federal Courts:
New Limitations
on Injunctive Relief

FEDERAL COURTS: NEW LIMITATIONS ON
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,
388 U.S. 281 (1970)
After an injunction against the picketing of a switching yard had been
denied in a federal district court, the railroad obtained an injunction in a
Florida circuit court. Two years later the union filed a motion in the circuit

court seeking to dissolve the injunction as improper in light of a recent
United States Supreme Court decision.'

The state court, distinguishing

the Supreme Court decision, denied the motion. The union then sought and
obtained an injunction in the federal district court prohibiting the enforcement of the state court injunction.2 Upon application to a United States
Supreme Court Justice, a stay of the federal court injunction was granted,
pending a petition for certiorari.3 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
had summarily upheld the federal injunction on the parties' stipulation.4
On certiorari the United States Supreme Court HELD, the district court

injunction was not justified under any exceptions to the federal anti-injunction statute, 5 and therefore its issuance was improper.6 Justices Brennan and
White dissented.
Because interpretation of the anti-injunction statute has always been
difficult,7 it is necessary to examine the instant case in light of the long legislative and judicial history that preceded it. Statutory limitations upon federal
court interference with state court proceedings began in 1793 when the
Judiciary Act of 1789 was amended. The language of that amendment was
unqualified: "[N]or shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings
in any court of a state."" Although several statutes creating special exceptions
were subsequently enacted,5 this prohibition retained its unconditional statutory language through the 1874 Statutory Revision'0 and the adoption of the
Judicial Code of 1911.11
Prior to 1941, however, some important judicial exceptions were made to
12
this general prohibition. One such exception was the "relitigation doctrine,"
which allowed federal courts to issue orders enjoining state courts from
1. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969).
2. No opinion reported, see 398 U.S. 281, 284 (1970).
3. 896 U.S. 1201 (1970). This application was made to Justice Black who wrote the
majority opinion in the instant case.
4. No opinion reported, see 398 U.S. 281, 284 (1970).
5. 28 U.S.C. §2283 (1970).
6. 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
7. See IA J. Moopx, FEDERAL PRAcTCE 2318, 1110.208 (2d ed. 1969).
8. 1 Stat. 335 (1793).
9. E.g., Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. §1397 (1970).
10. Rev. Stat. §720 (1874). This revision added the phrase "except in cases where such
injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy." However,
the general prohibition remains unchanged.
11. 36 Stat. 1162 (1911).
12. See J. MoonE, supra note 7,at 2304, ff0.208.
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relitigating issues previously litigated by federal courts. Although not expressly recognized in the Judicial Code of 1911, this well established doctrine 3
remained unchanged after the Code's adoption.14 In Dietzsch v. Huidekoper'15
the United States Supreme Court held that the anti-injunction statute 0 did
not prevent a court from enforcing its own judgment through issuance of an
injunction. The Court affirmed the action of a federal court that had enjoined
a state suit concerning issues previously decided by the federal court.
Despite this long history of judicial recognition and legislative acquiescence,' 7 the doctrine's viability was abruptly interrupted in Toucey v. New
York Life Insurance Co.'s In Toucey the insured brought an action in the
state court, but the case was removed to the federal district court on diversity
grounds. After losing on the merits, the insured assigned his rights under
the policy to avoid diversity jurisdiction, and his assignee brought suit in
the state court. The insurer filed an ancillary pleading asking the federal
court to enjoin the state suit, and the injunction was granted as necessary
to effectuate the prior judgment and prevent relitigation.19 The United
States Supreme Court vacated the injunction, concluding that the relitigation
doctrine violated the dearly expressed intention of Congress and was based
upon cases that either were not controlling or that supported the doctrine
20
only in a "loose and sporadic fashion."
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Reed emphasized the history of the relitigation doctrine and reasoned that Congress, by adopting the Judicial Code of
1911 without changing the anti-injunction section, had approved the doctrine.21 He added that without the relitigation doctrine federal litigants who
had expended time, money, and the court's energies to obtain a judgment
could, as a practical matter, not achieve a final determination. The losing
party could initiate another action in the state court, and the prevailing
party could only plead res judicata. The state court, although unfamiliar
with the record of the trial in the federal court, would have to determine
whether the issues were decided in the federal adjudication. 2 This added
expense and effort could be avoided under the relitigation doctrine by a
federal injunction of the state court proceeding.
Since it allowed relitigation of the same issues, the Toucey holding was
unsuited to modem needs.23 Strict adherence to the letter of a statute
13. See, e.g., 2 J. PoMzaoy, EQUITABLE REMiEDiEs §640, at 1079 (1905): "[A] federal court
may grant an injunction against a proceeding in a state court when necessary to render
effective its own decree."
14. Compare Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200 U.S. 273 (1906), with Supreme
Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).

15. 103 U.S. 494 (1880).
16. Rev. Stat. §720 (1874).
17. There is much disagreement concerning the meaning of congressional silence. See
Bikl60
18.
19.
20.
21.

The Silence of Congress, 41 HARv. L. REv. 200 (1927).
314 U.S. 118 (1941).
102 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1939).
314 U.S. 118, 139-40 (1941).
Id. at 143.

22. Id. at 144.
28. See J. MOORE, supra note 7, at 2310, f0.208.
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prompted by the political climate of 179324 was a dubious basis for repudiating a doctrine that had a useful application in modem practice. 25 Toucey
severely limited the injunctive powers of the federal courts and caused hard6
ship to many federal litigants.2
In 1948 Congress passed a revised judicial Code that contained the antiinjunction provision 27 interpreted in the instant case. Legislative history2s
indicates that the statute was revised to reinstate the law as generally understood and interpreted prior to Toucey. This revised statute retained the
general prohibition against federal court interference in state court proceedings but authorized three exceptions: (1) "as expressly authorized by act of
Congress," 29 (2) "where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction," or (3) "to protect
or effectuate its judgment." 30 The statute immediately reinstituted the relitigation doctrine in the federal courts. 81
Apart from the instant case, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the 1948 statute in only two other cases. The first, Amalgamated Cloth.
ing Workers v. Richman Brothers,32 held that the revised statute did not
convey a broad general policy for appropriate ad hoc application, but rather
was a dear-cut prohibition qualified only by specifically defined exceptions.33
The statute was further construed as continuing evidence of congressional faith
in the state courts and a desire to avoid conflict between state and federal
courts.3 4 Chief Justice Warren, dissenting, maintained that the expressed
purpose of the revised statute was to contract, not expand, the prohibition
of the earlier statute.3 5 He contended that by rejecting Toucey,6 Congress
37
had rejected its philosophy of judicial inflexibility.
The second case interpreting the statute, Leiter Minerals v. United States,38
held that the anti-injunction statute did not bar a federal injunction against
state proceedings when the United States sought the injunction. 39 The Court
referred to the "severe restrictions" of the statute and the difficulty of constru24. Passage of the statute was prompted by a general dislike and distrust for equity
jurisdiction. See Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 131, 132 (1941).
25. See J. MooRE, supra note 7, at 2310, ff0.208.
26. E.g., Sandlin v. Gragg, 133 F.2d 114 (10th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 785 (1943).
27. 28 U.S.C. §3384 (1970).
28. H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 181-82 (1948).
29. Id. This exception encompasses the acts noted in note 10 supra.
30. Id. The latter two exceptions encompass the relitigation doctrine.
31. E.g., Jackson v. Carter Oil Co., 179 F.2d 524 (10th Cir. 1950). After losing in the

federal court and being enjoined from further proceedings, claimant sued in the state court
on the same issue. Relying on Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941), the
federal court refused to enjoin the state proceedings. However, after the Judicial Code of
1948 became effective the defendant renewed his motion, and it was granted. The court of
appeals affirmed relying on the revised statute, 28 U.S.C. §2283 (1970).
32. 348 U.S. 511 (1955).
33. Id. at 515-16.
34. Id.

35. Id. at 523.
36. H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 181-82 (1948).
37. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 523 (1955).

38. 352 U.S. 220 (1957).
39. Id. at 226.
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ing "an ambiguous statute when the aids to construction are so meager."With the Supreme Court in doubt-' whether the statute was clear-cut as in
Richman or ambiguous as in Leiter, the lower courts applied the statute with
43
uncertainty. 2 The instant case should resolve much of this confusion.
In applying the anti-injunction statute to the instant facts, the Court
decided that the federal district court, by denying the railroad's request for
an injunction, had determined that the union had a right to picket under
federal law4 4 but had not determined whether federal law precluded an
injunction based on state law.4 5 Since the district court had not decided
whether federal law precluded a state injunction, it could not stay the state
court's injunction even if contrary to federal law. Not having determined
the federal issue, the federal court's injunction was not necessary "to protect
or effectuate" its judgment.46
The Court also held that the district court could not have issued an injunction as "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction."4 T While admitting the
breadth of the statutory language, the majority concluded it implied a concept
similar to that of protecting or effectuating prior judgments. The fact that
the requested injunction was related to the court's jurisdiction was not regarded as sufficient to warrant the issuance of an injunction. Before the
injunction could issue, the jurisdictional question had to be related to the
specific issue decided by the court in the initial request for an injunction.48
After this narrow application of the anti-injunction statute to the instant
facts, the Court enunciated a policy concerning future interpretation and
application that should dispel any doubts left by Leiter. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Brothers9 was cited to refute the contention that the
present anti-injunction act established merely a "principle of comity" rather
than a binding rule on the power of the federal courts. 50 The Court further
held that any doubts concerning the propriety of a federal injunction against
state court proceedings should be resolved in favor of permitting the state
5
courts to proceed to a final determination of the controversy. '
Justice Brennan, dissenting, termed the Court's construction of the district
court's order "niggardly." 52 He argued that the majority's policy of resolving
doubt against federal injunctive relief restricted the district court's power
40. Id.
41. It is interesting to note that Justice Frankfurter, who was known as a strict constructionist in procedural matters, wrote the majority opinions in Toucey, Richman, and
Leiter.
42. C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS 180 (2d ed. 1970).
43. E.g., compare Dilworth v. Riner, 343 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1965), with Studebaker
Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966).
44. Norris-La Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §101 (1970) and Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. §52 (1970).
45. 398 U.S. 281, 294 (1970).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 295.
48. Id.
49. 348 U.S. 511 (1955).
50. 898 U.S. at 286-87.
51. Id. at 297.

52. Id. at 304.
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to effectuate its judgments in a manner inconsistent with both the language
and the underlying policies of the statute.53 In light of the history of the
statute his dissent has substantial merit. When the relitigation doctrine was
abolished in Toucey, Congress revised the anti-injunction statute in order to
reestablish the doctrine.54 Although the statute was designed to restore the
law to its pre-Toucey status, this purpose has been frustrated by Richman.5
In the instant case the Court has so limited the doctrine that it may no longer
be useful to successful federal court litigants.
Hardship to individual parties must, however, be balanced against possible
friction in the federal-state relationship. The weight given to each depends
in part upon the type of individual right involved and the probability of
mistreatment in the state court. When the probability of mistreatment has
been great, first amendment rights weighed heavily in federal-state relations.
6 the Court
For example, in Dombrowski v. Pfister,5
bypassed prohibitions
of anti-injunction policy to preserve freedom of speech to an unpopular minority in a hostile atmosphere. 57 In his dissent, Justice Harlan warned that
the decision departed from a wise procedural principle designed to eliminate
premature federal interference in state proceedings.15
Although not in such a compelling way as Dombrowski59 the instant case
also involves freedom of speech,60 nonetheless, the Court construed the antiinjunction act to accord with Justice Harlan's warning. In addition to lacking
the special circumstances of Dombrowski the instant decision seems to be part
of a trend toward a more stringent hands-off policy regarding interference
by federal courts in state court proceedings. This new policy suggests that
controversies originating in state courts should be permitted to reach a final
determination in state judicial systems without interference from federal
courts.
Eitel v. Faircloth6' illustrates this trend in Florida. Applying the anti-

injunction statute strictly, the court refused to enjoin state proceedings and
remarked that decisions granting such injunctions polarize the state and federal judiciaries and undermine the basic respect for state judicial systems.62
Similarly, Paul v. Dade County63 affirmed a federal district court's refusal to

53.
54.
55.

Id. at 304-05.
H.R. REP'. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 181-82 (1948).
348 U.S. 511, 523 (1955) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).

56. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
57. Brewer, Dombrowski v. Pfister: Federal Injunctions Against State Prosecutions in
Civil Rights Cases-A New Trend in Federal-State judicial Relations, 34 FoRD. L. Rav. 71,

88 (1965).
58. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 498 (1965).
59. In Dombrowski state authorities were using an over-broad criminal statute to
harass Negroes working for an unpopular civil rights organization. See Cameron v. Johnson,
390 U.S. 611, 618 (1968).
60. Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), held that
picketing is a form of free speech protected by the first amendment.
61. 311 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
62. Id. at 1163.
63. 419 F.2d 10 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1065 (1970).
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hear a first amendment question because the constitutional claims had already
64
been adjudicated in the state court.
Whether the non-interference trend will extend to other areas of the
federal-state relationship is difficult to predict. School desegregation is probably the most critical area of current federal-state conflict. Some state courts
continue attempts to avoid the mandate of Brown v. Board of Education65
and its progeny while federal courts continue to enforce them. 66 A lessening
of friction between the two sovereigns would undoubtedly be beneficial;
however, individual rights are often involved that should not be readily
sacrificed in an attempt to promote a better federal-state relationship.
The Court in the instant decision, while admitting that the choice was
difficult, resolved the doubt in favor of lessening the friction.67 Naturally,
after exhausting state remedies, the labor organization has the right to appeal
any federal question to the United States Supreme Court. In the interim,
however, the union is forbidden to picket the railroad even though it may
68
eventually be determined that the picketing was constitutionally protected.
Considering the legislative and judicial history of the present antiinjunction act, the Court's interpretation of it in the instant case is unduly
restrictive. Particularly in the first amendment area, an individual may
suffer if his rights are held in abeyance while he exhausts state court remedies.
In controversies involving first amendment rights it is preferable to resolve
doubts in favor of allowing the exercise of those rights.
MICHAEL E. Cox

64. 202 So. 2d 833 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967), cert. denied, 207 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1041 (1968) (freedom of religion). A similar hands-off policy restricting
state courts from interfering in federal court proceedings was established in Donovan v. City

of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964), in which, after denial of an injunction by the state court,
the plaintiff sought a federal injunction. The Texas supreme court enjoined the federal

suit prohibiting further litigation of the controversy decided in the state court. City of
Dallas v. Brown, 368 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963). On certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court vacated the state injunction holding that although Congress has authorized

the federal courts to enjoin state proceedings in certain instances, the well-established rule
preventing state court interference in federal court actions has not been relaxed. An underlying rationale in Donovan was that the federal courts are supreme by virtue of their role
as primary enforcers of paramount federal law. Although Donovan might seem conceptually inconsistent with the instant case it is factually distinguishable since it involved a
state injunction of a federal claim rather than the converse.
65. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
66. E.g., Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
67. 398 U.S. 281, 296 (1970).
68. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369
(1969), involving similar parties, which allowed the union to picket in a terminal adjacent

to the switching yard in the instant case.
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